We are considering facial recognition or other biometrics. Is that allowed? (We take it from a vendor, Private party, not credit or insurance)

biometrics and identification

Inferring political opinions from uploaded photos

A platform analyses the biometric data in photos users have uploaded to infer their assumed political orientation and serve them targeted political messages. A comparable system infers assumed sexual orientation in order to serve advertisements.

Provenance: The Commission guidelines on prohibited AI practices treat this case as a worked example under Article 5. The document is non-binding: authoritative interpretation rests with the Court of Justice.

Relying on the ancillary feature exception requires that the feature is also strictly necessary for objective technical reasons alongside the main service, since both conditions apply cumulatively and advertising purposes do not meet that bar.

Commission Guidelines C(2025) 5052 final, 29.7.2025, worked examples under Article 5

biometrics and identification

Medical exception: accessibility yes, burnout detection no

An employer wants to deploy emotion recognition. In one scenario the system assists employees with autism and improves accessibility for blind and deaf colleagues. In the other it measures stress levels to flag burnout, boredom or loss of motivation.

Provenance: The Commission guidelines on prohibited AI practices treat this case as a worked example under Article 5. The document is non-binding: authoritative interpretation rests with the Court of Justice.

The medical exception is narrow: supporting a specific impairment qualifies, general monitoring of wellbeing, stress or motivation does not, and data gathered under a permitted use may not be reused for other purposes.

Commission Guidelines C(2025) 5052 final, 29.7.2025, worked examples under Article 5

biometrics and identification

Facial recognition company builds a database from social media

A software company runs an automated image scraper across the internet to detect images containing human faces on social media, stores them with source URL, geolocation and sometimes names, and converts the facial features into mathematical representations against which an uploaded photo can be matched.

Provenance: The Commission guidelines on prohibited AI practices treat this case as a worked example under Article 5. The document is non-binding: authoritative interpretation rests with the Court of Justice.

Images published publicly on social media do not amount to consent, and the decisive point is targeting: untargeted collection for a database capable of matching faces stays prohibited even when done step by step.

Commission Guidelines C(2025) 5052 final, 29.7.2025, worked examples under Article 5

biometrics and identification

Live facial recognition at a football stadium

Police install a van with mobile cameras and live facial recognition at the main entrance of a stadium during a European Championship match. The watchlist covers people suspected of offences ranging from serious crime to fraud and burglary, plus people of possible intelligence interest and vulnerable persons with mental health issues. There is no information linking a specific person to this event.

Provenance: The Commission guidelines on prohibited AI practices treat this case as a worked example under Article 5. The document is non-binding: authoritative interpretation rests with the Court of Justice.

A watchlist that mixes different kinds of suspicion and is not tied to the specific event is too unspecific, and the presence of one person for whom deployment would be allowed does not legitimise the whole operation.

Commission Guidelines C(2025) 5052 final, 29.7.2025, worked examples under Article 5

No mandatory course format, no certificate, no exam and no AI officer

The Commission Q&A on AI literacy states that there is no one size fits all when it comes to AI literacy and that no strict requirements or mandatory trainings are imposed. On certification, the Q&A states literally that there is no need for a certificate and that organisations can keep an internal record of trainings or other guiding initiatives. On assessment, it states that Article 4 of the AI Act does not entail an obligation to measure the AI knowledge of employees. On governance, it states that no specific governance structure is mandated to comply with Article 4, so that unlike the data protection officer under the GDPR, no AI officer needs to be appointed. On the level, the Q&A states that following the Digital Omnibus amendment AI literacy remains an obligation for providers and deployers of AI systems, but that no specific or sufficient level is mandated and that the Regulation does not require guaranteeing any specific level of AI literacy of any individual. Against that, the Q&A states that simply relying on the AI systems' instructions for use or asking staff to read them might be ineffective, and that organisations should take into account general AI understanding within the organisation, whether they are a provider or a deployer, the risks associated with the systems deployed, staff knowledge gaps considering technical knowledge, experience, education and training, and contextual factors such as sector, purpose and affected populations. The Q&A further states that organisations may implement different levels of training or learning approaches depending on knowledge, experience, education and role, and that staff with a degree or experience in AI development are normally considered AI literate, while the organisation must still verify that those persons understand the specific AI systems of the organisation, know how to deal with them and are aware of all risks.

Commission Q&A on AI literacy, sections on required level, training formats, certificates, assessment of knowledge and governance structures (consulted 9 August 2026)

Article 4 reaches beyond your own staff, and the national supervisor enforces it

The Commission Q&A on AI literacy states that Article 4 applies to providers and deployers of AI systems and in addition to other persons dealing with the operation and use of AI systems on their behalf, covering persons broadly within the organisational remit, with a contractor, a service provider and a client given as examples. On clients, the Q&A states that they may need AI literacy depending on the specific risk, reasoning that affected persons should understand how decisions taken with the assistance of AI will have an impact on them. On geographic scope, the Q&A states that the AI Act's legal framework applies to both public and private actors inside and outside the EU as long as the AI system is placed on the Union market, used in the Union, or its use has an impact on people located in the EU. On supervision, the Q&A states that the supervision and enforcement of Article 4 is not with the AI Office but under the remit of national market surveillance authorities, and that supervision and enforcement began on 2 August 2026, while Article 4 itself entered into application on 2 February 2025. On sanctions, the Q&A states that national market surveillance authorities could impose penalties and other enforcement measures for infringements of Article 4, that this will be based on national laws that Member States were due to adopt by 2 August 2025, that any sanction must be proportionate and based on the individual case taking into account factors such as the nature and gravity of the infringement and its intentional or negligent character, and that sanctions are more likely if there is proof of an incident due to a lack of appropriate training and guidance. Article 4 is not listed in the enumeration in Article 99(4) of the AI Act, which covers only Articles 16, 22, 23, 24, 26, 31, 33(1), (3) and (4), 34 and 50, so the level of any penalty for Article 4 follows from national law rather than from the Regulation's own ceilings. The Q&A further states that Article 4 reinforces the transparency provisions of Article 13 and the human oversight provisions of Article 14 and indirectly contributes to the protection of affected persons, and that for deployers of high-risk systems the Article 26 obligation to ensure staff are trained to ensure human oversight is a distinct requirement; that requirement becomes applicable on 2 December 2027 for standalone Annex III systems and on 2 August 2028 for Annex I systems.

Commission Q&A on AI literacy, sections on target groups, geographic scope, supervision and enforcement, and sanctions (consulted 9 August 2026)

AI agents must disclose both their AI nature and on whose behalf they act

Point (31) of the guidelines of 20 July 2026 states that AI agents are covered by Article 50(1) if they are capable of interacting with the persons instructing them or with other natural persons in the execution of their tasks, citing as examples making bookings, managing correspondence, negotiating or concluding contracts and executing purchases. That same point requires AI agents to be designed and developed so that they disclose both their artificial nature and the person on whose behalf they are acting, given the need for transparency of the origin and of the delegation of authority and accountability for the consequences of their actions. This also applies in complex multi-agent architectures in which other agents interact directly with natural persons. Where the provider cannot reliably determine before placing on the market or putting into service whether the agent will directly interact with a natural person, the agent should be designed at the architecture level and instructed to disclose itself in every situation where it is reasonably likely to interact with a natural person, including where that person represents a legal entity. Agents should also disclose themselves to the persons instructing them at key steps such as authorisation, reporting and validation, including where the agent receives, processes or relies upon outputs generated by other AI systems rather than by a natural person, and at every new interaction. Point (63) adds that Article 50(2) may apply to AI agents where the agent takes an action whose output is AI-generated or manipulated content perceptible by natural persons, while intermediate processing steps such as reasoning and chain of thought and non-perceptible actions such as a web request or browser action fall outside that scope.

Commission Guidelines C(2026) 5054 final, Section 3.1.1 point (31) and Section 4.1.2 point (63)

Artistic or satirical work is not exempt but attenuated, and the informative character always prevails

Point (119) of the guidelines of 20 July 2026 describes an attenuated transparency obligation for deep fakes forming part of evidently artistic, creative, satirical, fictional or analogous works or programmes, where the obligation is limited to disclosure in an appropriate manner that does not hamper the display or enjoyment of the work. Point (120) describes the categories: artistic works are created for the purpose of art, including music, cinematographic works and visual arts; creative works involve creative choices, while works mainly motivated by functional or technical considerations cannot be regarded as creative; satirical works are intended to criticise society, politics, business or public figures through humoristic techniques; fictional works involve persons, objects, places, entities or events in an imaginary but verisimilitude setting; analogous works share core traits with those categories without fitting neatly into one. Point (122) states that it must be evident to the natural persons exposed to it that the content falls within one of those categories, that the categories must therefore be interpreted strictly given the lighter disclosure regime and the interests of freedom of expression and freedom of the arts and sciences, and that content whose nature is potentially unclear or ambiguous to the audience falls outside this lighter regime. Relevant factors, per that same point, are whether the content displays formats or styles characteristic of the category, the context in which it is presented, and audience expectations. That same point excludes content whose nature is exclusively informative or commercial and recognisable as such, citing news reporting, notes that advertisements or documentaries may be regarded as evidently creative or fictional in certain specific situations but not in others because the assessment is case-specific, and states that where the deep fake combines multiple characters, for example informative and creative, the informative character should always prevail and the standard labelling requirements apply. Point (123) stresses that these deep fakes are not excluded from the obligation: the deployer must still disclose the AI origin or manipulation, but may do so in an appropriate manner, and must in any case comply with Article 50(5). Point (124) states that reliance on the attenuated obligation cannot justify failing to respect the fundamental rights of individuals or the rights of rightsholders under Union intellectual property or data protection law. As examples within the categories the document cites movies featuring AI de-aged existing actors or digital replicas of deceased actors, AI-generated music in the style of existing artists, and an AI-manipulated image of an existing politician in a scene clearly meant as humorous criticism. Outside the categories the document places among others an AI-manipulated video in the style of a teleshopping channel, AI-generated images of celebrities implying involvement in activities that never happened, and an AI-manipulated video featuring a realistic synthetic influencer focused solely on displaying a sponsored product's functionalities.

Commission Guidelines C(2026) 5054 final, Section 6.1.3, points (119) to (124) and the accompanying example lists